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REASON AND REVELATION: An Essay in Christian Apology. By J. R. Illingworth, M. A., D. D. London: Macmillan & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Demy 8vo. Pp. xx, 271.

Dr. Illingworth, I imagine, addresses his words to the general public rather than to the student. For he furnishes very few references. There may be throughout the book thirty, mostly appeals to the Fathers. In addition there is an appendix which contains some passages from English writers on religion of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is in accordance with this popular character that the author's method is that which Greek tradition marked off as rhetorical. I venture to think that he has not sufficiently kept in view the difference which holds between scientific method and the method of the advocate. He tries to persuade rather than to convince. He appeals from historical and textual criticism, and from the thorough-going search for truth to the presuppositions and prejudices of men who are immersed in the business of the world. And the instrument by which, at one stroke, he cuts away the ground from under the feet of the critic, is the *argumentum ad hominem*. Dr. Illingworth treats the possession of special knowledge in any subject as to some extent a disqualification for passing judgment upon the matters which fall within its sphere. You are a specialist, he says in effect, and therefore your judgment is to be disregarded.

This attack upon scientific method is made in the name of concrete knowledge. Concrete knowledge is gained "by studying things in as much of their context as possible," (p. ix). This might seem to refer to the specialist who certainly does so study things. What, however, is denoted, is something else; the presuppositions which are imported from the rest of our experience. The context referred to is rather *our* context (p. 61). And here I must express my regret that Dr. Illingworth should have introduced confusion by altering the sense of a very useful term. In the classification of the sciences, those are called abstract, which, like mathematics, deal with but one or two aspects of reality; those are called concrete which, like botany or political economy, deal with certain parts of reality considered in their context. But instead of contrasting mathematics with, say, the historical method, it is set over against "poetry, philosophy and knowledge of the world" (60). I say nothing of the impropriety of contrasting philosophy with any of the subjects of which it must take ac-

count, as though we were to contrast the notion of color with the notion of blue. But when we pass from any science to the other subjects, poetry and "knowledge of the world," we pass from realms in which knowledge is supreme, to the worlds of feeling or of practical opinion. The Socrates of Plato's "Apology" shall estimate for us both the poets and the men of the world. "I was conversing with a politician," says Socrates, "and he seemed both to others and to himself to be wise, but in reality he was not." And Socrates anticipated the appeal to the poets such as that which Dr. Illingworth makes. "I noticed," he says, "that because of their poetry they thought that they were the wisest men in other matters also, whereas they were not." Every reader of Plato will recall the discussion in which the distinction between "science" and "opinion" is established. Dr. Illingworth,—to use this old distinction,—is contrasting abstract knowledge not with concrete knowledge, but with mere opinion. For the conclusions which are formed by the poet and the man of the world as such, are after all mere opinion.

Let us consider for a moment what the value of such opinion is likely to be; I do not mean for the practical conduct of affairs, for that is not now in question, but for the study of the subjects with which practical opinion is conversant. So far are affairs from being an adequate training for the intellectual perceptions, that they have a noted tendency to lower the moral standard. That is to say, knowledge which is practical and nothing more, cannot apprehend even practice in its proper or ethical aspect. The disrepute which attaches to the name of Machiavelli, should rather fall upon the statesmen whose methods he analyzed. And although in some directions the moral dangers of practical affairs are lessened nowadays, it is doubtful whether things are really so much better as they seem. For the defects of an age are often those of which it is least conscious. Dean Church in a striking passage, ("Occasional Essays," I, 237), warns "Christian explorers and expounders of truth" against those "entangling and difficult paths of public activity in which it is easy for the thinker, the divine teacher to pass into the religious partisan, the religious manager, contriver and meddler." Dean Church viewed the English religious politics of the sixties and seventies from the inside. There is no reason to think that the beginning of the twentieth century is the dawn of a new era.

Having dealt with the method of Dr. Illingworth's book, let us

now turn to the subject matter, the Christian revelation. "The Trinity, the Incarnation and the Church," he says, "together constitute the revelation that God is love" (184). Such was not the opinion of the first Christian apologists. For them the Christian revelation turned upon the life of Jesus and upon the division of the human race into the believing and the unbelieving. Christian theology as a system begins with Origen, and he in turn derives from the gnostic commentaries upon the "Fourth Gospel" by Theodotus and Heracleon. The aspect of Christian teaching which by its novelty most impressed those to whom it was first imparted, was that God was the Father, not of all men, but of those who believed in Jesus Christ. And these doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Church, which Dr. Illingworth treats as primordial, are themselves inferences elaborated by arguments of a special kind. If the reason is to yield to practical opinion, then certainly there is no such discipline as Christian theology. For, as Aquinas says, "theology is practical knowledge, but, to a greater degree and in a more eminent sense, speculative knowledge."

It thus appears that Dr. Illingworth setting out to weaken the authority of strictly systematic reasoning by an appeal to the uninstructed opinion of the Christian public, inevitably calls in question the fundamental articles of his creed. He is met with this dilemma. Either the logic of the Alexandrian fathers is valid, or it is not. If it is not, what becomes of the Nicene creed?

There is another striking inconsistency in Dr. Illingworth's book which may serve as a further warning against the "concrete" method. He defends the Johannine authorship of the "Fourth Gospel," by casting doubts upon the orthodoxy of every one who impugns it (109). I am not called upon to discuss this problem, but only the sophistical argument by which Dr. Illingworth would solve it. I will content myself with one remark. Certitude of an intellectual, as distinguished from a moral character, can only be reached by examining and questioning and testing all presuppositions. The charge of heterodoxy has been employed from the first to burke all enquiry and I am surprised that it should be employed in a work which claims to be philosophical in form. If one thing is certain, it is that the argument from tradition taken alone cannot stand. Tradition about the history of the church was questioned in the *Magdeburg Centuries* and the works of Scaliger and Casaubon. Historical criticism waited two centuries more before it was in a position to deal with the Bible. It has at-

tained probable results with reference to the "Old Testament," results of which Dr. Illingworth takes account when he speaks of the doctrine of the Fall (227). "The account in Genesis is obviously mythological in form." Yes, obviously, but to whom? To the critic, but not to uninstructed opinion. And this method which has been successively applied to the history of the church, and to the "Old Testament," Dr. Illingworth rejects when he comes to the "Fourth Gospel," by arguments which would have prevented any advance upon the historical conceptions of the middle ages.

I wonder how the "concrete" method affects the case of Cyril of Alexandria? Julian, we are told, would have been unknown to us but for Cyril: "it was the Christian who survived." Yes, as the Alexandrian prince-bishop, "whose Christianity did not succeed in making him just," (Harnack, "History of Dogma," iv, 174), or (to quote a more orthodox writer) in whom "dogmatic interests overpowered all other considerations" (Westcott, *St. John* xcvi).

The absence of references makes it difficult to estimate Dr. Illingworth's indebtedness to Newman's "Grammar of Assent." Newman also has a great deal to say about concrete knowledge and real assent. His whole treatment of the subject however is much more systematic and argumentative than Dr. Illingworth's. Certitude is based by him upon the convergence of many probabilities, not upon the use of presumption drawn from practice.

The student of ethics is concerned, more than at first sight appears, with this "concrete" method. It encourages that prejudice against systematic thought, which is one of the weaknesses of the Anglo-Saxon mind. At any time such a result ought to be deplored, but above all at the present, when every thing is being subordinated to the most immediate and obvious utilities, and when the wider and deeper relations of things are passing out of the common view. The "concrete" method is part of the equipment of the advocate and rhetorician; it has no place among the instruments of disinterested inquiry.

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THE DAWN OF DAY. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Translated by Johanna Volz. New York: Macmillan & Company. 1903.

In this new translation of "Morgenröthe" English readers may see Nietzsche perhaps at his best. In experimenting upon the